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By Professor Mark J. Loewenstein*
In January of this year, the Delaware Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 1 upholding a provi
sion in a certificate of incorporation that designated the federal
courts as the exclusive jurisdiction for the litigation of claims
under the federal Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"). 2 The inclu
sion of these provisions in Delaware charters and bylaws-often
referred to as "Federal Forum Provisions" or FFPs-raised
important questions as to the reach of the internal affairs
doctrine. This doctrine provides that the jurisdiction of incorpora
tion regulates the internal affairs of its corporations: the relation
ship among and between the corporate officers, directors and
shareholders. Although, strictly speaking, the Court left this defi
nition of internal affairs untouched, the practical effect of the de
cision was, perhaps, to expand the reach of state corporate law by
expanding the kinds of provisions that a corporation may include
in its charter and bylaws. I will return to the implications of
Salzberg after a summary of the opinion.
A. The Supreme Court opinion.

The Court began its opinion quoting an example of the FFPs
from the charters of two of the three corporate parties to this lit
igation (Stitch Fix, Inc. and Roku, Inc.):
Unless the Company consents in writing to the selection of an
alternative forum, the federal district courts of the United States of
America shall be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any com•
plaint asserting a cause of action arising under the Securities Act of
1933. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any
interest in any security of [the Company] shall be deemed to have
notice of and consented to [this provision] . 3

The corporate parties had amended their charters to include
FFPs before filing for their initial public offerings, presumably to
avoid having to litigate 1933 Act claims in state court. Unlike the
Securities Act of 1934, the 1933 Act expressly provides that
private rights of action may be filed in either federal or state
*Monfort Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. The author
thanks Sarah Keller, Class of 2022, for her valuable research assistance on this
article.
© 2020 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Fall 2020

182

SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JouRNAL

courts. It is likely that the corporate parties preferred to litigate
any such claims in federal court, where the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) would apply. The PSLRA
includes various provisions generally perceived as less favorable
to plaintiffs than state law.
The FFPs in this case were challenged on the basis of two
arguments: first, that FFPs do not relate to the internal affairs of
the corporation and, therefore, are beyond the jurisdiction of
state law; and second, provisions added to the Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) in 2015 at least implicitly preclude
such provisions. Focusing on the former argument, the Chancery
Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,4 writing
that "the constitutive documents of a Delaware corporation can
not bind a plaintiff to a particular forum when the claim does not
involve rights or relationships that were established by or under
Delaware's corporate law."5 Because "the Federal Forum Provi
sions attempt to accomplish that feat," the court held that the
provisions are "ineffective and invalid."6
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed. 7 The Court began its
analysis with Section 102(b)(l) of the DGCL, which provides,
generally, what may be set forth in a Delaware certificate ·of
incorporation. It allows "any provision for the management of the
business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and
any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the pow
ers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders . . ."8
Deconstructing this provision, the Court noted that it authorizes
"two broad types of provisions: any provision for the management
of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corpora
tion, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating
the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders,
or any class of the stockholders, . . . if such provisions are not
contrary to the laws of this State."9 The Court followed this with
its conclusion: FFPs are facially valid and fall within either of
these categories because they seek to regulate the forum in which
"intra-corporate" litigation may take place. 10
The impetus for FFPs was triggered by the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement
Fund, 11 which held that federal and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over claims under the 1933 Act, and that such claims
if filed in state court are not removable to federal court. This
holding led to a dramatic increase in 1933 Act claims in state
court and in parallel class actions filed in both state and federal
courts. The result was a chaotic and, in some cases, an unmanage
able situation ,fof · corporate defendants. Thus, the Delaware
Supreme Court:;concluded, FFPs were necessary to ensure
"judicial economy and avoid duplicative efforts among courts in
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resolving disputes."12
The Court also rationalized its holding on the basis of private
ordering, noting that since charter amendments require stock
holder approval and are considered "contracts among a corpora
tion's stockholders" 13 they "should be respected as a matter of
policy." 14
Finally, the Court dealt with two arguments that plaintiffs
relied upon: certain amendments to the DGCL adopted in 2015
and the case of ATP Tour, Inc v. Deutscher Tennis Bund. 15 Among
other things, the 2015 amendments added § 115, which autho
rized charter provisions that designated Delaware as the
exclusive jurisdiction for "internal corporate claims" and defined
that term as claims "(i) that are based upon a violation of a duty
by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such
capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the
• sion also invalidates charter pro
Court of Chancery. "18
visions that prohibit Delaware courts from hearing such claims.
Plaintiffs' argument with respect to the 2015 amendments thus
rested on the implication that because § 115 did not explicitly al
low provisions like FFPs, it implicitly forbade them. The Court
rejected this argument, relying primarily on traditional rules of
statutory interpretation and on what it called a ''holistic reading''
of § 115. That section was limited, by its terms, to "internal.
corporate claims" while FFPs address 1933 Act claims, which are
quite different. Indeed, the Court noted that federal courts are
"most experienced in adjudicating them."
Plaintiff's argument based on ATP, though successful in the
Chancery Court, did not persuade the Supreme Court. In ATP
the Delaware Supreme Court had answered a certified question
on referral from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit regarding a fee-shifting provision in the bylaws of a Dela
ware nonstock corporation. A member of the corporation chal
lenged the fee-shifting provision following an unsuccessful claim
against the corporation under the federal antitrust laws, Dela
ware fiduciary law principles, and other claims. The Delaware
Court advised the federal court that the fee-shifting bylaw was
facially valid. Plaintiffs in the Salzberg litigation argued that the
Court in ATP upheld the fee-shifting provision because the
underlying litigation involved claims under Delaware law (among
other claims) and, therefore, the bylaw dealt with "internal af
fairs," a permissible subject for bylaws. FFPs, however, relate to
claims governed by federal law and, therefore ,. are beyond the
scope of permissible bylaws. On this argument the Court made
perhaps the most important pronouncement in the case: claims
under Section 11 of the 1933 Act "are 'internal' 'in the sense that
they arise from internal corporate conduct on the part of the
© 2020 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Fall 2020
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its impact on the internal affairs doctrine. It was on this basis
that the Chancery Court held the FFPs were not enforceable:
they went beyond the internal affairs of the corporation. The
Supreme Court held that charter provisions are not limited to
internal affairs; such provisions need only be within the limita
tions of DGCL § 102(b)(l). A robust view of this section would
justify a charter provision that, say, mandates arbitration for
claims br
t by stockholders under the federal securities laws. 24
Whether the charter (or bylaw) provision is a forum selection
provision or an arbitration provision, the claim may be brought
outside of Delaware in defiance of the provision. The court would
have to decide whether the robust reading of the Salzberg court
should be followed or the traditional internal affairs doctrine, as
articulated by the Chancery Court in this litigation. Given how
zealously courts tend to guard their jurisdiction,21 the corporate
defendant may not fare well.
Another possible challenge to the internal affairs doctrine
comes from the opposite direction: state statutory law that does
relates to the internal affairs of corporations chartered elsewhere
but headquartered or at least doing business within the state
enacting the law. A recent California law, for instance, mandates
gender diversity on the boards of publicly held corporations
headquartered in California. 28 The composition of a corporate
board of directors is arguably the quintessential internal affair,
but California courts are unlikely to deny enforcement of its law
which is grounded on public policy-even if the foreign corpora
tion, headquartered in California, had a charter provision that
conflicted with the California mandate. That development may
prompt other states to attempt similar forays into regulations
and laws that encroach on the internal affairs of foreign corpora
tions subject to its jurisdiction with the resulting dilution of the
internal affairs doctrine.
Delaware legislators· should take note of these developments.
Ai!J Professor Manesh has noted, if Delaware corporations are too
aggressive in defining the rights of their shareholders, particularly in the area of federal law, they invite federal regulation.27 If
the California le
tion is upheld, other states may decide to
regulate foreign corporations within their jurisdiction even if that
regulation falls within the traditional view of the internal affairs
doctrine, as articulated by the Chancery Court in this case.
Combined, these developments threaten the hegemony of Dela
ware as a place to incorporate.28 That, in turn, also threatens and
puts in jeopardy the fiscal benefits to incurporating in Delaware. 29
187
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Questions left open by the opinion.

1. What about claims against underwriters and other
professionals?

Salzberg only upheld the facial validity of FFPs that relate to
1933 Act claims against the corporation and its officers and
directors. But 1933 Act claims typically include claims against
underwriters and other professionals connected to the public of
fering, some of whom (particularly underwriters) may have agree
ments requiri the corporation to indemnify them. This raises
the question whether 1933 Act claims may proceed against
those defendants in state court while a parallel action proceeds
in federal court against the corporation and its officers and
directors. The answer appears to be yes. This, in turn, suggests
that underwriters may require their Initial Public Offering (IPO)
clients to remove FFPs from their Delaware certificates of
incorporation to avoid having to bring a separate action for
indemnification.
2. What about claims made by investors who were not
shareholders of the corporation at the time that they
made the investment that is the subject of the liti
gation?
1

The Salzberg court rationalized its decision, in part, on private
ordering.The shareholders had agreed to the provision and
should be bound by it. But if the purchaser in an IPO was not a
shareholder before the investment, can it be argued that there
was a contractual agreement between the corporation and the in
vestor?30 The corporation could argue that a purchaser of its stock
makes that investment "knowing'' of and "accepting" the terms of
the charter and bylaws so, yes, there is a contract. This scenario
may be one in which a future court limits the reach of Salzberg
and rules that it only applies if the claimant was a stockholder at
the time of the stock acquisition in question.
3.

May FFPs be included in bylaws?

The bylaws of a Delaware corporation may contain provisions
that are similar to those permitted in the certificate of
incorporation. Section 109(b) of the DGCL provides: "The bylaws
may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law . . ., relat
ing to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs
and the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees."31 By comparison, the language in § 102(b)(l) permits
provisions "for the management of the business" and provisions
"creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders . .. "32 So, the
relevant question is whether FFPs relate to the business of the
corporation or the rights or powers of its stockholders. At least
C 2020 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Fall 2020
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arguably, they do. Further, if the certificate of incorporation al
lows directors to amend the bylaws, FFPs may be imposed by the
directors acting without stockholder approval.
4. Under what circumstances may a Delaware court.
deny enforcement of an FFP?

The Supreme Court in Salzberg emphasized that the FFPs
before it were facially valid and enforceable, implying that there
may be circumstances in which such a provision would not be
enforced. One example may be when the plaintiff is not a
stockholder before becoming the subject of the 1933 Act complaint.
Under those· circumstances, the plaintiff might argue that a
charter provision cannot limit the rights of a person whose cause
of action arose simultaneously with becoming a stockholder. Note,
as well, if the litigation is filed in a state court outside of Dela
ware, the court might rule that the FFP cannot limit its jurisdic
tion and are inconsistent with its law. Finally, the Salzberg court
recognized three circumstances under which an FFP might not
be enforced: "There are three bases on which forum-selection pro
visions might be invalidated on an 'as applied' basis: (i) they will
not be enforced if doing so would be unreasonable and unjust; (ii)
they would be invalid for reasons such as fraud or overreaching;
or (iii) they could be not enforced if they contravened a strong
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether
declared by statute or by judicial decision."�
As to first circumstance, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated
that the relevant criterion is whether "trial in the contractual
forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will
for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court. "34
Otherwise, "there is no basis for concluding that it would be
unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain."35
It seems unlikely that a plaintiff could prevail on this test: not
only does the 1933 Act provide that actions may be filed in federal
court, but federal courts are likely to be more experienced in
resolving such actions than are state courts.
As to "fraud and overreaching," this too seems like a high
hurdle for plaintiffs challenging FFPs. By definition, these provi
sions are set forth in the bylaws or charter, and most likely· the
latter. In turn, these documents are filed as part of the registra
tion statement and the FFP may be specifically mentione� in the
prospectus.�
Finally, an FFP does not appear to contravene any, state public
policy, much less a strong one. A state would have to adopt a stat
ute or a state court would have decide a case that articulates a
state policy against litigating a federal cause ofaction in a federal
court. This is hard to imagine.38
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5. Does the 1933 Act preempt an FFP?

As the 1933 Act expressly provides actions may be brought in
federal or state court, a preemption argument may be asserted
that precluding state court actions is preempted. While this ques
tion has not been addressed, it is worth noting that in Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld an arbitration provision that implicitly precluded state
court litigation under the 1933 Act. 37
D.

Some Concluding Thoughts.

The public policy ramifications of the Salzberg decision has at
least two aspects. First, is the decision's impact on the concept of
internal affairs. At its core, that doctrine limits the reach of state
corporate law, and at the same time is protective of state
corporate law. A state can legislate, for instance, that corpora
tions chartered there must give shareholders at least 10 days' no
tice of a shareholders meeting, and other states may not extend
that period for corporations doing business or holding shareholder
meetings there, but chartered elsewhere. The doctrine thus clari
fies which state's laws apply in a given controversy. In Salzberg,
however, there arguably was such a conflict: federal law provided
that 1933 Act claims may be filed in federal or state court, while
the corporate charters in Salzberg, sanctioned by the Court's de-·
cision, provided that such claims against the corporation may be
filed only in federal court. More importantly, the Court rejected
the Chancery Court decision that invalidated the FFPs on the
basis that they addressed a matter beyond the corporations'
internal affairs holding, instead, that Delaware charters are not
bound by the internal affairs doctrine. Rather, at least with re
spect to forum selection provisions, it is enough if the matter to
be litigated relates to "intra-corporate" matters which, in turn,
the Court defined broadly. Thus, while the Delaware corporate
code did not, expressly, extend the internal affairs doctrine, the
Salzberg Court authorized corporations to do so in their certifi
cates of incorporation, a sort of backdoor extension of the inte�nal
affairs doctrine.
Second, it is important to recognize the context of the decision.
The corporate defendants in Salzberg reacted to a very real
problem in a creative way.38 To limit the risk of costly and duplica
tive litigation that might follow a public offering of stock, they
included FFPs in their charters. The underlying policy question
is whether this is an appropriate role for private ordering. When
Congress enacted the 1933 Act and provided that claims thereun
der may be brought in either federal or state court, it did not
preface the provision with "unless otherwise agreed." The very
real threat of frivolous securities litigation has motivated all
sorts of responses, including, of course, the enactment of the
© 2020 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Fall 2020
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PSLRA itself FFPs are just another response in what seems to
be an ongoing battle, suggesting that it may be time for Congress
to re-visit the question of securities litigation. So, while Salzberg
is nominally about private ordering and the internal affairs doc
trine, it is also about corporations trying to limit litigation. If the
,Salzberg decision survives, if state courts outside of Delaware
honor FFPs and dismiss 1933 Act litigation, and if Congress does
not respond, then private ordering will have achieved an
important victory. But, this scenario seems unlikely and the
Salzberg victory may be short lived.
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